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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the resurgence of national-level social bargaining in two European states: Portugal and 
Spain. It argues that this development derives from the combination of two main factors: the weakening of 
trade union organizations at the branch and firm level, and the emergence of new institutions to promote 
tripartite social bargaining. These developments contributed to a transformation in the pattern of industrial 
relations. In both countries new emerging constraints and incentives to change largely determined the 
interaction and strategies of the social actors. In addition, in a new economic, political, and social environ-
ment the strategies of the social actors were less conditioned by pre-existing institutions. On the contrary, 
the changing balance of power affected their predisposition to pursue other strategies through a new set of 
institutions. Finally, the paper also examines the implications of the Portuguese and Spanish experiences 
for the broader debate on European Monetary Union    2
 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper analyzes the resurgence of national-level social bargaining in two Eu-
ropean states: Portugal and Spain. It focuses on domestic responses to, and policy conse-
quences of the European integration process. The paper seeks to account for the 
responses of these two countries to the pressures exerted by these processes. In the 
opinion of some scholars, the combined impetuses of globalization and the process of 
European monetary unification have imposed exigencies of increasing competitiveness 
on national economies which have compelled countries to deregulate their labor markets, 
welfare systems and industrial relations (Crouch and Streeck 1997). According to this 
view, these pressures for change have undermined coordinating capacity and eroded 
social bargaining. This paper challenges the interpretation according to which the re-
sponses of European countries to these pressures are uniform. Contrary to this prediction, 
this paper shows that in Spain and Portugal globalization and EMU have promoted rather 
that undermined social bargaining. Unable to escape from economic interdependence the 
Iberian countries have experimented with social concertation as a means to address and 
resolve tensions between economic interdependence and political sovereignty, and 
between monetary an exchange rate policies (see Cameron 1998).  
In addition, this paper seeks to address the impact of globalization1 and European 
economic integration on the literature of neo-corporatism. The neo-corporatist literature 
seemed to show in the 1970s that centralized social bargaining (or concertation) could 
mitigate the tradeoffs between inflation and unemployment by allowing economic actors 
and governments to coordinate their actions and resolve certain collective action prob-
lems (Schmitter 1981, Cameron 1984, Bruno and Sachs 1985). This early optimism was 
subsequently dispelled. Much of the literature of the 1980s argued that centralized bar-
gaining could succeed only in countries which met certain institutional criteria: highly 
encompassing and cohesive business and labor organizations, coordinated collective 
bargaining, and Social Democratic parties in government. Changes in the world econ-
omy, however, led other scholars (Scharpf 1987, Iversen 1999) to argue that the decline 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this project we adopt the IMF's definition of globalization: "the growing interdepend-
ence of countries worldwide through the increasing volume and variety of cross-border transactions in 
world and services and of international capital flows, and also through the more rapid and widespread 
diffusion of technologies" (IMF, World Economic Outlook, 1997).    3
of Fordism, the liberalization and integration of financial markets, and changes in sec-
toral and occupational structures had undermined the bases for centralized bargaining. 
This tendency, according to these authors, would be reinforced by events such as the 
European Monetary Union that would further de-couple the level at which macroeco-
nomic policy was set (Iversen 1999). In other words, these developments would confirm 
the undoing of Schmitter's "Century of Corporatism" (1974) (Pérez 1998, Royo 1988, 
Royo 2000).  
This conclusion, however, is challenged by the resurgence of national level bar-
gaining on income policy and other economic issues in a number of European states such 
as Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, or Ireland during the 1980s and 1990s. This pa-
per analyzes the resurgence of national-level social bargaining in two such European 
states: Portugal and Spain. It argues that this development derives from the combination 
of the weakening of trade union organizations at the branch and firm level (evidenced by 
the relative decline in union density and the incapacity of trade unions to mobilize work-
ers in a response to manpower policies to liberalize the labor market) and the emergence 
of new institutions to promote tripartite social bargaining in both countries (the Spanish 
Economic and Social Council, CES and the Portuguese Permanent Committee for Social 
Concertation, CPCS). The consolidation of the CES and CPCS has resulted in the institu-
tionalization of the political struggle among the government, employers, and trade 
unions, and it has contributed to a transformation in the pattern of industrial relations. 
The paper argues that the choices made by the social actors were less conditioned by pre-
existing institutions. On the contrary, in both countries the changing balance of power 
affected the predisposition of the social actors to pursue their strategies through a new set 
of institutions. At the same time, new emerging constraints and incentives to change 
largely determined their interaction and strategies. Finally, the paper also examines the 
implications of the Portuguese and Spanish experiences for the broader debate on Euro-
pean Monetary Union (EMU), and the role that centralized social bargaining may play in 
EMU. 
 
THE QUEST FOR THEORY 
In his seminal article, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" (1979) Philippe C. Schmitter 
rescued the concept of corporatism. He defined it as "a system of interest and/or attitude    4
representation, a particular modal of ideal-typical institutional arrangement for linking 
the associationally organized interests of civil society with the decisional structures of the 
state," (Schmitter 1979, 9). In this article Schmitter highlighted the discrepancies be-
tween corporatism and pluralism, described the differences between state and societal 
corporatism, and argued that the corporatization of interest representation was related to 
certain imperatives of capitalism to reproduce the conditions for its existence by incorpo-
rating subordinate classes and status groups to the political process (Schmitter 1979, 24-
25). Finally, Schmitter explored Mihaïl Manoïlesco's claim that the twentieth century 
would be the century of corporatism (Manoïlesco, 1936). According to his analysis if "it 
all began during and immediately after World War II," then we have to admit that "we 
are presently right smack in the middle of the century of corporatism and hence con-
demned to live with it for another fifty or so years." (p. 40). Yet, he stressed the new 
tensions facing both societally and statist corporatist systems and concluded that the 
inability of corporatist systems to resolve these tensions would lead to their eventual (and 
sooner than anticipated) demise.   
In spite of the tensions advanced by Schmitter, the persistence and success of so-
cietal corporatist systems in the last quarter of the Century seemed to validate Manoïles-
co's claim. Indeed, the superior economic performance of countries in which social bar-
gaining has flourished, particularly the 'organized' economies of Northern and Central 
Europe in the 1970s-1980s, instigated a new wave of literature that sought to explore the 
institutional conditions associated with these cases of success (Katzentein 1985 Gold-
thorpe 1984, Berger 1981). These scholars sought to analyze why attempts at social 
bargaining have been more successful in these countries and not in others, and they have 
focused on institutional conditions, as the explanatory variable, to account for the success 
of social bargaining in certain countries. For instance, the failed experiment with social 
bargaining in countries such as Britain in the 1970s confirmed, according to them, the 
hypothesis that corporatist policies could only work under certain institutional conditions. 
Based on the analysis of cases of success, the corporatist literature has highlighted three 
aspects of the institutional setting to account for the successful implementation of solida-
ristic policies and social bargaining in countries such as Austria, Sweden, Norway, the 
Netherlands, and Belgium.     5
According to this literature, the prisoner's dilemma associated with wage restraint 
suggests that the more encompassing the union movement, the greater the concentration 
among unions, and the more centralized the authority of the peak associations, the more 
likely it was that wage restraint would be achieved (Cameron 1984; Golden 1993; Gold-
en, Wallerstein, and Lange 1999, 195). Therefore, the success of corporatist bargaining 
depends on the organization of unions: their monopoly of representation; their strength 
and inclusiveness (i.e. the union density); and the level of union coverage (which refers 
to the proportion of employers who are covered by collective bargaining contracts and 
indicates the extent to which unions affect wage levels in the economy). These features 
ensure the capacity of unions to comply with centralized agreements, while minimizing 
the costs associated with wage moderation. 
The second variable highlighted by the literature to account for the success of so-
cial bargaining (or concertation) has been the structure of the system of collective bar-
gaining–that is, the degree of coordination and/or centralization of the wage bargaining 
system. This variable, according to the literature, is critical to guarantee the implementa-
tion of incomes policy because it determines whether the social actors will take into 
account the macroeconomic considerations of wage bargaining (Scharpf 1991, 178-192; 
Golden 1993, 439-454). According to this view, highly centralized bargaining allows 
unions to internalize the negative externalities of excessive wage settlements (i.e. infla-
tion and unemployment), thus helping them to solve a collective action problem. Calm-
fors and Driffill (1988) developed an influential theoretical hump-shaped model 
connecting the degree of centralization in wage bargaining with the level of unemploy-
ment across industrialized countries for the period 1974-1985. They concluded that 
unemployment was lower at the extremes of the model, that is in countries that had either 
highly centralized or highly decentralized wage-bargaining systems, while countries with 
intermediate systems of wage bargaining performed the worst. This study has been 
criticized on conceptual grounds (see Soskice 1990; Golden 1993) and the hump-shaped 
relationship was disproved by the increase in unemployment in countries with highly 
centralized wage bargaining institutions in the late 1980s (i.e. Sweden). 
A final group of scholars has emphasized the importance of another factor, name-
ly, the organization of employer associations (Swenson 1992, Pontusson and Swenson 
1996). According to this view, a cohesive and centralized employers organization will fa-   6
cilitate centralized bargaining with unions, while fostering agreements that will increase 
the competitive position of firms (i.e. by including vocational training schemes that will 
increase productivity), thus, allowing firms to increase real wages while containing labor 
costs (Hall and Soskice 1999, Soskice 1999). 
The main problem with this literature, as has been extensively developed else-
where (Royo 2000, Pérez 2000), is that it renders a highly deterministic path for econo-
mies that do not fit into the conceptual model (i.e. the so-called 'under-organized' 
economies). According to this view, in the absence of supportive institutional factors that 
will bolster social concertation attempts, countries (such as Spain, Portugal, or Italy) 
lacking the institutional preconditions of the corporatist countries should abandon at-
tempts at social concertation, deregulate their labor markets, and decentralize their wage 
bargaining systems (see Pérez 1998, 5-6). In other words, they should shift toward the 
liberal-market model exemplified by the United States and Britain. Contrary to this 
prediction, however, since the 1970s (Spain) and the 1980s (Portugal) there has been a 
resumption of national social bargaining in both countries. 
Furthermore, the consolidation of social concertation in Spain and Portugal also 
weakens the arguments that have attempted to account for the collapse of social demo-
cratic corporatism in the 1980s in traditional corporatist countries such as Sweden and 
Denmark. This collapse led other scholars to conclude that pressures induced by technol-
ogy restructuring changed the international economic environment in the 1980s rendering 
corporatism unfeasible (Scharpf 1991, 26-28). The conventional wisdom about the do-
mestic effects of changes in the production system is that they have undermined the 
structural bases of corporatism by significantly weakening organized labor movements. 
These changes resulted in higher demand for scarce highly skilled labor, which in turn 
fostered wage differentiation and labor segmentation. They also had a serious impact on 
concertation because they shifted the balance of power between labor and capital in favor 
of the latter. At the same time, the increasing wage differentials also hindered concerta-
tion because centralized bargaining did not offer enough flexibility to take into consid-
eration particular circumstances that would justify wage differentials. In contrast, wage 
differentiation fosters decentralized bargaining. These developments have led some 
scholars to conclude that labor market institutions have lost their ability to tailor wage    7
developments to external competitiveness constraints (Iversen 1996, Pontusson and 
Swenson 1996). 
A somewhat different argument made in the literature postulates that the combi-
nation of increasing exposure to trade, capital mobility, and swelling direct foreign 
investment has contributed to limit the effectiveness of domestic governments to develop 
domestic economic strategies, has prompted a policy race to the neoliberal bottom and, 
thus to the abandonment of Social Democratic corporatist strategies  (Scharpf 1991, 258). 
According to this view, these developments have rendered expansionary macroeconomic 
policies far less feasible, thus eroding the prospects for concertation, because the threat of 
'exit' by mobile asset holders has forced governments to scrap Keynesian expansionist 
policies, and implement supply side policies which lowered taxes and industry subsidies 
in order to promote efficient market allocation. Otherwise investors would move their 
capital and investment to less taxing and more profitable environments. In this new 
environment, the implementation of traditional Keynesian-expansive policies would only 
result in higher inflation and balance of payments crisis. These authors (Scharpf 1991; 
Regini 1995) have concluded that corporatism and demand Keynesiansim were only suc-
cessful in the context of the 1970s.  
A number of authors have challenged this interpretation (Garrett 1997, Swank 
1997, and Royo 2000). These authors point out that contrary to the prediction that the de-
cline of Fordism, the liberalization and integration of financial markets, and changes in 
sectoral and occupational structures had undermined the bases for centralized bargaining, 
social democratic corporatism has lost no further ground in many countries like Belgium, 
Austria, Norway, Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands. Furthermore, the decade has 
witnessed the cooperation between governments and labor in nontraditional SD corpora-
tist countries such as Spain, Portugal, Australia, Italy, Greece, the Czech Republic, and 
Ireland. In these countries governments have solicited the involvement of their peak fed-
erations of labor and business in major economic policy decisions. Structural changes 
and similar constraints imposed by the international economy did not prevent those 
governments from reaching agreements with unions, and in many cases, from imple-
menting incomes policies. In these countries, labor leaders have cooperated to improve 
macroeconomic performance, which has helped to elicit support from the business sector, 
and have been able to transfer the support of most workers to the agreements. And all this    8
despite the fact that labor market institutions are not so encompassing as those of the 
traditional SD corporatist countries (i.e., union density and collective bargaining cover-
age are comparatively low, and authority is not highly concentrated). As a result of these 
policies, these governments have experienced better economic performance.  
In Spain incomes policy was effectively sustained for almost a decade (from 
1978-1986) and, after the collapse of social concertation in 1986, and following the 
defeat of the Socialist government in 1996, there has been a resurgence of national social 
bargaining exemplified by the 1997 agreement between employers and unions to articu-
late the levels of collective bargaining and reduce dismissal costs for certain categories of 
workers. 
In Portugal this development has been more explicit and dramatic. So far in Por-
tugal, there have been social concertation agreements for the following years: 1987, 
1988, 1990, 1992, 1996, and in 1996 another Agreement of Strategic Concertation for the 
1997-1999 period. This last agreement is particularly significant because it includes most 
areas of macroeconomic and social policies.  
The following sections analyze the resurgence of national-level social bargaining 
in Portugal and Spain. I argue that in both countries the changing balance of power af-
fected the predisposition of the social actors to pursue their strategies through a new set 
of institutions. New emerging constraints and incentives to change largely determined 
their interaction and strategies.  
 
DEVELOPMENTS IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL 
 
SPAIN 
Concertation in Spain emerged in the late 1970s, at the time of the transition to 
democracy. The transition to democracy took place in midst of one of the worst economic 
recessions experienced in Spain since the 1950s. The second oil crisis, the lack of com-
petitiveness of the Spanish economy, a wages explosion, and the international economic 
crisis, resulted in a sharp increase in unemployment (14.6 per cent by 1981), and inflation 
(15.2 per cent by 1981). These developments provided the context for the emergence of 
agreements between the social actors-business, unions, and the government. The political 
and economic crisis convinced the new democratic government of the need to implement    9
incomes policy based on top level agreements among the two major labor confederations, 
the employers associations, and at times the government. This process was known as 
'social concertation' and it began with the Pactos de La Moncloa of 1978, which were 
signed by all major political parties as part of the transition to democracy process. The 
Pactos de la Moncloa were followed by five additional agreements. The purpose of these 
agreements was to define the new industrial relations setting, to restrain wage demands to 
control inflation and foster the recovery of business profits, and to contain labor militan-
cy, which might pose a threat to the stability of the new regime by provoking the army 
and the extreme Right. From the late 1970s until the mid-1980s, five major agreements 
were reached between the government, unions and business. The government only signed 
two of them (the 1982 ANE and the 1984 AES). While concertation took place under 
conservative governments (1978-1982 and again in 1997), the socialists were only able to 
reach two concertation agreements to cover three years (1983, 1985, and 1986). Figure 1 
includes the agreements and its signatories:  
 
Figure 1: Concertation Agreements in Spain 1979-1986 
AGREEMENTS                                    YEARS   
 
Acuerdo Básico Interconfederal (ABI)   1979  
Acuerdo Marco Interconfederal  (AMI) 1980-1981 
Acuerdo Nacional de Empleo  (ANE)     1982  
Acuerdo Interconfederal  (AI)                 1983 
Legislative Imposition                             1984    
Acuerdo Ecónomico y Social  (AES)     1985-1986 
ACTORS 
 
CEOE-UGT 
CEO-UGT-USO 
CEOE-UGT-CCOO-GOVT. 
CEOE-UGT-CCOO   
 ----------  
UGT-CEOE-GOVT./UGT-CEOE 
   
On balance, the final assessments of these agreements is very positive. There is 
generalized consensus that concertation contributed greatly to the consolidation of the 
new democratic regime. They fostered consensus and facilitated agreements over the 
content of the new Constitution, thus, contributing to social peace and providing the 
foundation on which the transition process was consolidated. Moreover, concertation also 
fostered the development of new laws regulating the industrial relations framework, 
helped mitigate industrial conflict, and contributed greatly to the institutional consolida-
tion of the unions and their recognition as the legal representatives of workers, thus 
'normalizing' industrial conflict. Finally, concertation also contributed to the integration    10
of the social actors, unions and business' organizations, in the new political and economic 
system.  
From a macroeconomic standpoint, concertation also had very positive effects. By 
introducing macroeconomic considerations into collective bargaining, concertation made 
possible that wages behaved according to inflationary objectives, and inflation was re-
duced from 26.4% in 1977 to 8.8% in 1986. Moreover, wage moderation and lower infla-
tion resulted in higher business profits which, in turn, fostered confidence, investment, 
and jobs in the second half of the 1980s. Indeed, concertation increased the profitability 
of capital via wage moderation, lower inflation and labor costs, and social peace. In 
Spain, labor costs accounted for at least 60% of the total costs of Spanish businesses in-
curred in the 1970s. From 1982 to 1986 wage moderation and social peace helped to 
lower that figure by 6.4 percentage points, which contributed to the recovery of business 
profits. Higher business profits, in turn, increased the profitability of business investment 
and increased the capacity of business to reinvest. As a result of this development, start-
ing in 1985, investment picked up and increased from 18.9% in 1985 to 24.4% (or 7.5%) 
in 1989 (Folgado 1989, 494). Investment growth also contributed to job creation in the 
second half of the 1980s, when employment grew an average of 2.9% yearly. Finally, 
concertation fostered social peace and reduced industrial conflict and resulted in a dra-
matic decline the number of strikes during the concertation years (in 1977 there were 
16,641.70 days lost by strikes, and in 1985 2,803) (Royo 2000, 96-108).  
In spite of its effectiveness, the concertation process broke down after 1986. One 
of the consequences of the concertation process had been a substantial decline in real 
wages (between 1979 and 1986 the average cumulative growth of real gross salaries had 
been -1.2%, see Roca 1993, 215-217). For 1987, and seeking to compensate for this loss 
in the purchasing capacity of workers, the unions demanded wage increases 2 points 
above the government inflation target. In this new context of unions' demands, the gov-
ernment decided to abandon the concertation process. In response, after another failed at-
tempt to reach an agreement in 1988, the UGT decided to break its relationship with the 
government and to develop a new unitary strategy with the CC.OO. that evolved into a 
more confrontational stance against the government policies and culminated in the gen-
eral strike of December 1988 (see Gillespie 1990, Astudillo 2000, and Royo 2000)    11
The collapse of concertation had very negative consequences for the Spanish 
economy. Conflict re-emerged again after 1986 (in 1987 strikes shot up and there were 
5,020 working days lost, and in 1988, excluding the general strike, 6,843) (see Roca 
1993, 258). Furthermore, after concertation broke down, wages grew beyond govern-
ment's inflation targets on a regular basis, particularly at the end of the 1980s (see Table 
1), forcing the government to tighten up monetary policies; this in turn resulted in further 
increases in unemployment. Since the socialist government's economic strategy hinged 
on the cooperation of the union, the collapse of concertation ultimately doomed the 
success of its policies. 
The failure of concertation in Spain after 1986 has been explained in terms of the 
lack of institutional capacity to implement effective incomes policy on the part of the 
unions (see Boix 1998, Astudillo 2000, and Maravall 1997). These authors have focused 
on the fragmentation and competitive nature of the labor movement with the two main 
unions (UGT and CC.OO) vying with each other for members and votes, the low levels 
of unionization, and finally, the 'intermediate' structure of the collective bargaining 
system. Stated differently, according to this view, this failure seems to confirm the 
corporatist literature's prediction that attempts to implement corporatist strategies in 
countries lacking the institutional preconditions of the 'organized' economies will fail and 
will be bound to abandon this strategy (Pérez 1998). 
However, as other authors have indicated (Royo 1998 and Royo 2000) this expla-
nation fails to take into consideration the effectiveness of concertation in controlling 
wages and reducing inflation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Wages versus Inflation, 1984-1990    12
Year Wage 
Increases 
CPI (Real)  Real Wage 
Growth 
1982  12 14.4  -2.4 
1983  11.4 12.2 -0.8 
1984  7.8 11.3 -3.5 
1985*  7.9 8.5 -0.6 
1986*  8.2 8.8 -0.6 
1987  6.5 5.2 1.3 
1988  6.4 4.8 1.4 
1989  7.8 6.8 1.0 
1990  8.3 6.7 1.4 
EL País, November 18, 1996. Developed with data from the from the Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad 
Social. 
* Last two years of concertation. 
 
These authors have also challenged the interpretation that links the collapse of 
concertation in Spain to the lack of institutional capacity to support an effective incomes 
policy on the part of the Spanish unions. Royo explains the breakdown of the Spanish ex-
periment with social bargaining after 1986 in terms of the institutional dependence and 
subordination of the main trade union (the UGT) on the Spanish Socialist Party, which 
led the Socialist government to default repeatedly on promises made to the union (see 
Royo 1998 and Royo 2000). 
  Furthermore, contrary to the prediction that the liberalization and integration of 
the Spanish economy coupled with the absence of institutional preconditions, would 
favor a progressive decentralization of wage bargaining and the liberalization of Spanish 
labor markets, the 1990s has witnessed the re-emergence of social bargaining at the 
national level in Spain. This process started in 1994 between the unions and employers, 
but the electoral defeat of the socialists in the 1996 general election and the victory of the 
conservative Partido Popular in Spain brought about an unanticipated development: the 
resurgence of national-level bargaining between the government, business, and labor 
unions on diverse regulatory items. This development further challenges the conventional 
wisdom about the undoing of corporatist institutions by the pressures of international    13
market competition and integration. This resurgence was particularly surprising given the 
perception of Spain as lacking encompassing labor market institutions. 
  In Spain, although there has not been a return to incomes policy negotiated cen-
trally at the national level, there has been a return to national-level social bargaining in 
the 1990s. Since 1994 cooperation among the bargaining actors has been very significant. 
In 1994 the business confederation, Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empre-
sariales (CEOE) and the two major union confederations (CC.OO. and UGT) signed the 
'Interconfederal Agreement to Regulate Labor Ordinances and Labor Regulations.' This 
pact sought to fill the gaps left by the repeal of the Labor Ordinances established during 
the Franco regime in 22 subsectors that still lacked a replacement agreement and to regu-
late the devolution of regulatory competencies to the collective bargaining process.  
The return to social bargaining at the national level on other key issues continued 
in 1996 when the same actors signed the 'Tripartite Agreement for the Extra-Judicial 
Resolution of Labor Conflicts,' which developed a new system to resolve labor conflicts 
that may emerge between workers and employers. The pact established mechanisms for 
mandatory mediation and voluntary arbitration of collective bargaining conflicts (includ-
ing conflicts over labor mobility, minimum services prior to strikes, layoffs, and modifi-
cations of work conditions) (Fraile 1999, 299-200). The main goal of this agreement was 
to avoid the formalization of this kind of conflicts in labor courts. Furthermore, in 1996 
the unions and the conservative government negotiated an agreement on pension reform 
largely based on a previous agreement signed by the major political parties (the Toledo 
pact). This agreement aimed at improving the financial situation of the pension system 
and to make it more equitable. The CEOE refused to sign it because it did not include 
lower payroll taxes.2 
In 1997 the unions and employer organizations signed a 'Tripartite Agreement on 
Professional Training' to foster cooperation between unions and employers to train work-
ers. The most significant agreement, however, was negotiated between the two largest 
confederations (UGT and CC.OO.) and the employers' association (CEOE) in 1997 to 
                                                 
2 The reform included the following measures: it widened the pension base from the last 8 years of 
contributions ceiling to the level of the highest one, it separated funding for basic pensions from the 
contributory system while creating a reserve fund, and it set curbs on fraud and disability pensions. The 
reform also indexed pension to inflation, eased eligibility for old age pensions and early retirement, raised    14
limit employers’ liability to high redundancy costs and to restructure the collective bar-
gaining system. As a result of this negotiations the social actors signed two new agree-
ments in 1997, the 'Interconfederal Accord for Employment Stability,' and the 
'Interconfederal Agreement on Collective Bargaining and Coverage Gaps' These agree-
ments had the following goals (De la Dehesa 1997, 45; Fraile 1999, 299-300): 
 
(1) to promote permanent employment by tightening the use of fixed-term con-
tracts and shifting financial incentives.  
(2) to introduce new indefinite contracts with lower redundancy costs and reduce 
social contributions to promote indefinite contracts over temporary ones.  
(3) to reform article 52-C of the Workers' Statute that regulates the termination of 
all contracts for objective reasons to facilitate its implementation by labor 
courts.  
(4) to rationalize the existing collective bargaining system and to deal with the 
phasing-out of the Labor Ordinances. It called for a clearer articulation of the 
levels of collective bargaining, stipulating that it would be desirable to reserve 
some items, including wage increases, for national-level sectoral bargaining. 
The accord also set general guidelines about the different responsibilities 
among bargaining levels (see Fraile 1999, 299-300).  
These agreements constituted an important milestone, not only because they were 
negotiated pacts, (as opposed to the previous two reforms of 1984 and 1994 that were in-
troduced by the socialist government) but also because dismissal costs were one of the 
most contentious issues between employers and the unions.3 
  Finally, although there has not been a return to incomes policy in Spain, wage de-
mands have been moderate and only slightly above expected inflation, and most recent 
wage settlements have reflected this strategy. This development had very positive conse-
                                                                                                                                                 
the minimum pension for young widows and broadened conditions for orphan pensions. See Fraile 1999, 
290-291. 
3 Union leaders labeled this agreement as 'a clear example of social consensus in Spain,' see 'All Sides Hail 
Spain’s Job Pact,' in Financial Times, April 10, 1997, p. 3. Unions agreed to this reduction in return for a 
promise by employers to convert temporary contracts into indefinite ones. The result of this reform after 2 
years has been the creation of two million new indefinite contracts. However, one of the major objectives 
of the reform, which was to reduce the level of temporality (at 32.5 percent the highest in Western Europe), 
has not been achieved. For an analysis of the consequences of the reform see: Pérez Infante 1998, 150-153.    15
quences for the Spanish economy. Economic performance in the second half of the 1990s 
has been characterized by lower fiscal deficits, reduced inflation, and currency stability. 
Spain's cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit has been reduced from 5.5 percent of GDP in 
1992, to 1.6 percent in 1998, and inflation dwindled from 5.1 percent in 1993 to 2.1 in 
the 12 months to May 1999. Moreover, interest rates have fallen from 13.4 percent in 
October 1992 to 4.8 percent in July 1999, and employment grew at 2.9 percent in 1997 
and 3.4 percent in 1998 (with growth forecast by the OECD at 2.6 percent in 1999 and 
2.4 percent in 2000). The convergence process laid down in the Maastricht Treaty (public 
spending is only 41 percent of GDP), combined with social peace and wage moderation 
fostered by the return of national social bargaining, have contributed to a new virtuous 
circle characterized by sustained rapid growth, improving fiscal position, lower unem-
ployment, and higher investment and productivity which in turn will promote rapid 
growth.4 
 
PORTUGAL 
  In Portugal the emergence of social concertation has been more explicit and sus-
tained over time, and it has included incomes policy. In Portugal social concertation start-
ed later, in 1987, but as opposed to Spain, concertation did not collapse in the 1980s and 
it has been consolidated in the 1990s. So far in Portugal, there have been social concer-
tation agreements the following years: 1987, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1996, and 1996 and an 
Agreement of Strategic Concertation for the 1997-1999 period.5  
  The emergence of national social bargaining in Portugal took place at the outset 
of a dramatic economic crisis that took place from 1983-85. To give an idea about the 
magnitude of the crisis, in one year (1984) the GDP declined 1.6%, investment fell 18%, 
unemployment shot up to 8.3%, inflation reached 29.3%, disposable family income 
decreased by 3.7%, and private consumption was down 3.0%. The legislative elections of 
1983 had resulted in a 'Center Block' coalition between the conservative Social Demo-
                                                                                                                                                 
See also 'La reforma laboral logra dos millones de contratos, pero la tasa de temporalidad no cede,' in El 
Pais, Monday May 17, 1999. 
4 See Martin Wolf  'The Gain in Spain' in the Financial Times, Wednesday July 7
th, 1999, p. 10. See also the IMF's 
Public Information Notice No. 99/65 'IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation with Spain,' June 30, 1999 in which the 
IMF praises the Spanish government for its economic policies. 
5 In 1991 the social actors signed two complementary agreements regulating professional training, hygiene, 
and security in the workplace.    16
cratic Party (PSD) and the Socialist party (PS) under the leadership of Mario Soares, 
(leader of the PS) as Prime Minister. This government implemented an IMF stabilization 
plan, and created the Standing Committee for Social Concertation (CPCS) a state institu-
tion for tripartite macroeconomic and social bargaining in 1984 (see below). 
  The first agreement was concluded in 1986. Negotiations among the social actors 
(excluded CGTP) proceeded throughout 1986. Under the guise of 'recommendations on 
incomes policy' the members of the CPCS (the UGT, the government, and the three 
representative employers' associations, CIP, CCP, and CAP6) reached an incomes policy 
agreement which fixed wage increases at 7% subject to actual inflation. This agreement 
dealt almost exclusively with the rate of growth of nominal wages for 1987 and it was 
based on forecasts of inflation that proved correct, thus contributing to curbing inflation. 
The process of social concertation continued after the legislative elections of 1987 
when the PDS won a parliamentary majority. In October of that year the CGTP, with the 
public support of the Communist party (PCP), decided to enter the CPCS. The unions 
linked the government's program of structural reform (aiming at the revision of labor leg-
islation, privatization, and the revision of the Constitution and the Agrarian Reform) to 
incomes policy. On January 18, 1988, the social actors represented in the CPCS reached 
a new agreement on incomes policy (except the CGTP and the CIP, who refused to sign 
it).  
  Contrary to expectations, the disinflation process stopped in 1988, and UGT with-
drew its support for the agreement when the government refused to adjust wage increases 
to recognize higher inflation (Campos Lima and Naumann 1997). The consequence of 
this development was that no agreements were reached for 1989 and 1990, although 
moderation continued to prevail in collective bargaining. The increase in inflation, 
however, fueled by huge budget deficits pushed the social actors again to the bargaining 
table. In 1990 the government presented a social pact to the social partners, the Programa 
de Progresso Económico e Social para os Años Noventa. This initiative led to intense 
negotiations that concluded in the Acordo Económico e Social (AES) signed by all CPCS 
                                                 
6 The Confederation of Portuguese Industry (CIP), the Confederation of Portuguese Commerce (CCP), and 
the Confederation of Portuguese Agriculture (CAP). The Communist union (CGTP) which had refused to 
take its seats in the CPCS and pursued a strategy of strike politicization, refused to participate in this 
agreement. The government negotiated with the unions (UGT) and introduced three new versions of the    17
members except the CGTP, which participated in the negotiations but refused to sing it. 7 
This ambitious pact included the reduction of the working week from 48 to 44 hours, 
with a gradual reduction to 40 hours by 1995, as well as a wide range of issues to be 
regulated by future legislation: dismissals, health, safety and hygiene at work, unem-
ployment benefits, vocational training, working-time flexibility, supplementary social 
security in cases of industrial restructuring, collective bargaining, and employment of 
minors. A recommendation on wage policy was also included (capping wage increases at 
13.5%). Furthermore, the agreement also approved (for the first time in the course of 
tripartite negotiations) the annual revision of the national minimum wage at 40,000 
escudos. The AES led to a new Pacote Laboral in 1991 to revise the legislation on firing 
for inadaptation, work of minors, work hours, holidays, the rules of collective bargaining, 
and arbitration of labor conflict.8 In July of 1991, all the CPCS members including, for 
the first time, CGTP signed two 'sub-agreements' on work safety/hygiene, and profes-
sional training. 
  Following the general elections of October 1991, which resulted in a PSD abso-
lute majority, the social actors reopened negotiations in the CPCS with the aim of reach-
ing a new AES. After gruesome and protracted negotiations over wage increases (marked 
by the government's insistence to contain wage costs), the three main employers' confed-
eration, the UGT and the government signed a new agreement on February 15
th of 1992. 
This pact set wage increases at 9.75%, and minimum wage increases at 11%. 
  After a four-year lapse, peak-level bargaining continued with two agreements in 
1996. The most significant one was the Acordo de Concertação Estratégica, ACE (the 
'Strategic Concertation Agreement') that covered the 1997-99 period. It comprised a cata-
logue of macro-economic aims and a program for employment and competitiveness. 
Among the issues included in this pact were: the contractual distribution of productivity 
gains, the promotion of competitiveness among Portuguese companies, and a policy of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Pacote Laboral. The unions, however, considered the modification insufficient and continued their 
campaign against the reform. 
7 The CGTP, demanding 15% in wage increases and a minimum wage of 41,500 escudos, refused to sign 
the agreement, although its secretary general, Carvalho da Silva, insisted that 'positive things have been 
negotiated' and agreed to take the agreement to the CGTP plenary for debate. This provoked a major 
struggle within CGTP (see Stoleroff 1992, 143-144). The CAP also refused to sign this agreement 
8 The reform introduced in January was turned down by the Constitutional Court in March. The govern-
ment introduced a revised version that was approved in August of that year.    18
overall wage growth consistent with goals to achieve international competitiveness and 
the integration of Portugal into the European Monetary Union.  
There is significant disagreement in Portugal over the actual impact of these 
agreements.9 Most scholars recognize the contribution of the concertation process to the 
political process and the establishment of a bargaining mindset among the social actors. 
Indeed, the process of social concertation has been credited for its contribution to social 
bargaining, solidarity, and social cohesion. It has also helped to develop institutional 
mechanisms that have allowed the social partners to participate in the decision making 
process, thus deepening democracy, and fostering social peace (Da Silva Lopes 1999, 
95). The impact of these pacts on economic performance and the labor relations, how-
ever, is open to controversy. Economic performance improved dramatically throughout 
the 1990s (i.e. inflation was reduced from 13.4% in 1990 to less than 3% in 1999 and the 
economy grew an average of 6.4% throughout that period), but the line of causality 
between these agreements and the economic results is not clear. It is important to high-
light that (contrary to Spain) the main trade union confederation, the CGTP, did not sign 
any of the main agreements. Therefore, the institutions of social concertation in Portugal 
have not influenced labor relations in Portugal as dramatically as they have in Spain. 
Furthermore, although wage restraint contributed to the impressive rate of eco-
nomic growth in Portugal during the last 15 years, it cannot be solely attributed to the 
process of social concertation. Wage moderation has been the result of a combination of 
factors, including: the role of the informal economy exercising downward pressure on 
wages, the economic crisis, the high levels of unemployment during the recessions, and 
the relative weakness of Portuguese unions.  
The main impact of the social pacts has been that they introduced macroeconomic 
considerations into collective bargaining and pegged, for the first time in 1986, wage in-
creases to expected inflation (as opposed to past inflation). This new mechanism made 
possible that wages behaved according to inflationary objectives. Indeed, it is to be 
stressed that in the years where there have been social dialogue agreements the figures 
for inflation rates indicate a significant fall (Mozzicafreddo et al 1997, 76). At the end, 
                                                 
9 For a detailed analysis of the impact of these agreements see among others: Stolefoff 1992, 25, Da Silva 
Lopes 1999, 94, Mozzicafreddo et al 1997, 75-82, and Pires de Lima 1999. See also Natif (1995, 127-152) 
for an examination of the structural and institutional constraints upon adoption of a neocorporatist order in 
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the recommendations on wage policy included in the agreements were fulfilled (and this 
is even more remarkable if we take into account the fact that CGTP did not sign them) 
and this allowed for a reduction of unit labor costs and contributed to the disinflation 
process. Finally, they also contributed to social peace (see table 2). 
These developments were accompanied by the reduction of interest rates in the 
second half of the 1990s, the income derived from privatizations, European funds, and 
improvements in fiscal efficiency. The combination of all these factors allowed Portugal, 
which as late as 1997 was considered an outside candidate for joining the euro-zone, to 
comply comfortably with the Maastricht criteria in a relatively painless way. Indeed, Por-
tugal was the only country able to reduce its budget deficit to below 3 percent of GDP 
(the Maastricht criteria) while increasing current government spending (see Financial 
Times, Wednesday March 31, pp. 11-13). And this stands in stark contrast to the dis-
appointing performance of the Spanish economy after concertation failed in 1986. 
 
Table 2: CPI, Contractual Wages, Productivity, and Unemployment in Portugal 
1981-1997 (percentage change over previous years). 
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
CPI  19.6  11.8 9.4  9.6 12.6  13.4  11.4  8.9 6.5 5.2 4.1 3.1 2.3 
Wage 
growth 
22,.5 17.8 14.4  9.9  10.6 14.1 14.2 10.9  7.9  5.1  5.0  4.7  3.6 
Real 
Wages 
2.9 6.0 5.0 0.3 -2.0 0.7 2.8 2.0 1.4 -0.1 0.9 1.6 1.3 
Unem-
ploym
ent 
8.5 8.5 7.0 5.7 5.0 4.5 4.3 4.1 5.5 6.9 7.2 7.3 6.9 
Pro-
ductiv-
ity 
-  -  3.7 2.3 2.6 2.3 -0.7 8.8 2.4 0.8 2.4 2.5 2.3 
R*  - - 7 6 -- --  13.3  9.75  -- -- --  4.5  3.5 
Strikes  504  363 213 181 307 271 262 409 230 300 282 274 265 
Sources: ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics. Geneva: Switzerland. Various Years and OECD: Economic 
Surveys. Portugal 1998. Paris: OECD, 1998 and OECD: Economic Surveys. Portugal 1999. Paris: OECD, 
1999. The average productivity increase for the 1987-1996 period was 2.7%. 
* R= Recommendation on wage policy included in the centralized agreements 
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THE EMPIRICAL PUZZLE: EXPLAINING THE RESURGENCE OF NA-
TIONAL SOCIAL BARGAINING 
The development of national social bargaining in Spain and Portugal challenges 
the extended notion that social bargaining can only be successful in the context of en-
compassing labor and business institutions. It also defies the idea that globalization will 
force countries towards a neoliberal model. It is true that there have been setbacks in the 
institutionalization of this process: i.e. changes in labor market regulations have been 
implemented unilaterally by the governments of both countries with strong opposition 
from unions (i.e. the 1994 labor reform in Spain or the 1990 Pacote Laboral in Portugal). 
Furthermore, in Spain the breakdown between the government and the unions caused the 
collapse of concertation after 1986. Nevertheless, as indicated in the previous section, in 
both countries there has been a general trend toward a greater institutionalization of col-
lective bargaining to resolve regulatory issues and reform the labor relations settings. 
How can we explain such a development? 
The political economy literature offers some interpretations of the rise of social 
bargaining in some European countries in the 1990s. I shall now briefly examine these 
explanations, their strengths and shortcomings. Each one of these interpretations sheds 
some light over this empirical puzzle, but they fail to provide a satisfactory explanation 
for this development.  
According to some of the literature, the re-emergence of national social bargain-
ing could be explained as a consequence of the pressures faced by Spain and Portugal to 
participate in the EMU project. Indeed, it has been argued that the difficulties that these 
countries experienced fulfilling the EMU convergence criteria and now to continue com-
plying with it, fostered the development of social pacts as symbols of the national goal to 
achieve EMU membership, a goal which precluded internal divisions (see Regini 1999, 
19). There is little doubt that EMU offered the Spanish and Portuguese social actors an 
important incentive to reach agreements. The consequence of this interpretation, how-
ever, would be that this strategy would collapse once the objective to participate in EMU 
has been achieved (both countries became founding members of EMU on 1 January 
1999). Nevertheless, the institutionalization of incomes policy in Portugal and the resur-
gence of social bargaining in Spain suggest otherwise. This explanation also fails to 
explain why concertation processes started in Spain and Portugal (or Ireland for that    21
matter) long before the process of EMU was initiated. Moreover, it is important to 
emphasize that these strategies were strongly supported by businesses and the govern-
ments in both countries (Stoleroff 1992, 141; Royo 2000, 285) and that they took place in 
the context of labor reforms that intended to promote bargaining decentralization (Pérez 
1998, 12). Finally, as Regini indicates (1999, 19) this interpretation fails to account for a 
number of cases (i.e. the Netherlands) where there has been emphasis on concertation 
even though fulfillment of the EMU criteria was taken for granted. 
A second interpretation explains this development in terms of the balance of 
power among the actors involved (see Regini 1999, 20). For instance, some scholars have 
explained the re-emergence of national social bargaining in Italy as resulting from the 
weakening of its actors who needed to rely on each other to address the mounting eco-
nomic and social challenges (Salvati 1995). As Regini indicates (1999, 20), however, this 
explanation cannot be generalized to other nations (i.e. Sweden) where trade unions are 
still very powerful, and yet centralized collective bargaining and solidaristic wage polices 
have collapsed. Conversely in other countries (i.e. Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, and 
Ireland) the trade unions are still rather weak and yet concertation has flourished. 
Another explanation has focused on the economic structure and the interest of ac-
tors. Some scholars (Regini 1997; Regini and Regalia 1997; Rhodes 1997) have devel-
oped a micro-economically-centered analysis to explain the return to national social bar-
gaining in Italy in the 1990s. According to them, this development reflects an attempt by 
employers to reconcile the need to control costs through more flexibility in hiring prac-
tices and the need for cooperative relations at the firm level in order to remain competi-
tive. In other words, these arrangements constitute an institutional mechanism to support 
business competitiveness through consultative practices.  
This analysis is similar to the arguments forwarded by Garrett (1997) and Soskice 
(1999). They have argued that in Social democratic corporatist countries, organized busi-
ness has sought regulation (instead of deregulation) in order to confront more effectively 
the new challenges posed by globalization, seeking to preserve for their companies the fi-
nancial systems, training frameworks, and research networks that allow them to remain 
competitive in international markets. The problem with this explanation, however, is that 
it is difficult to generalize. In Britain (like in Italy), for instance, firms operate in a de-
regulated context that is not conductive to the production of collective goods that may    22
improve their competitive position. Yet, British firms are not seeking to correct this 
imbalance (see Regini 1999 22-23). 
Yet, another interpretation has attributed the emergence of social bargaining to 
the aim by the European economies to converge on an intermediate model (i.e. Rhodes 
model of 'competitive corporatism,' 1997). According to Regini (1999, 24) this interpreta-
tion helps to account for processes of change and divergences. The main shortcoming of 
this explanation, according to him, is that it fails to consider that the system toward 
which most countries seem to be converging (the German model) it is currently strained 
with tension and unrest, and it is the subject of strong pressure for change. Therefore, 
how can it 'continue to orient the responses of other European economies?' (Regini 1999, 
24) 
These analyses are important in explaining the lack of convergence towards a 
British-style deregulation of labor markets in many countries. Some observers of the in-
dustrial relations scene have emphasized, however, that they neglect another critical ex-
planatory factor, namely the inability of employers and governments to impose wage 
moderation and curve inflationary expectations in the absence of centralized bargaining 
(Pérez 1998, 13-23). Analyzing the return to national social bargaining in Italy and Spain 
in the 1990s, Pérez argues that these agreements reflect the inability of Spanish and Ital-
ian producers to control costs and the failure of their governments to achieve macroeco-
nomic policy objectives in the 1980s. According to her argument, governments in Spain 
and Italy failed to restrain wages by relying on a tight monetary policy and a strong cur-
rency stance, because employers could not control costs in a fragmented and decentral-
ized bargaining context in which inflation was exacerbated by the overvaluation of the 
currency. Therefore, the government and businesses were interested in the return to na-
tional bargaining as a way to achieve their goals. 
The main problem with this economic centered analysis, however, is that it has 
been developed with the aim to demonstrate that there has been a process 'from de-
centralization to reorganization' in collective bargaining to control wages supported by 
the government and business. The empirical evidence shows, however, that this has not 
been the case. In Spain and Portugal there has been little decentralization, therefore, it is 
hard to conclude that there has been a 'reorganization' of collective bargaining. It is true 
that there has been a resurgence of social bargaining at the national level to address    23
industrial relation issues. This process, however, has not included a 'reorganization' of 
wage bargaining in either country, which challenges the notion that there has been a 
process of decentralization of collective bargaining and deregulation of labor markets. On 
the contrary, in spite of attempts to decentralize the collective bargaining process (i.e. the 
labor reform of 1994 in Spain), the structures of collective bargaining have remained 
remarkably stable in both countries. While there has been an increase in the number of 
agreements signed at the company level in Spain (72.7% in 1998), the number of workers 
covered by such agreements has decreased (from 17.2% in 1984 to 10.6% in 1997). In 
Portugal these figures have remained stable (70.6% of the collective agreements were 
sectoral in 1991, and 73.4% in 1996). Finally, in contrast to Italy, it is important to 
emphasize that unions in Spain and Portugal (particularly the CGTP) oppose a return to a 
formal incomes policy framework and this has not taken place recently. 
Furthermore, the economically centered analysis offered by Pérez is important in 
explaining the interests of employers and the government in the return to national social 
bargaining to impose wage restraint and meet inflationary objectives (particularly in the 
context of the EMU convergence criteria). This argument, however, fails to account for 
the unions' decision to accommodate business and governments' demands and return to 
national social bargaining in both countries. Indeed, it is important to emphasize that na-
tional social bargaining collapsed in Spain after 1986, and that in spite of repeated at-
tempts on the part of the government to negotiate incomes polices with the unions (i.e the 
1990 'Competitiveness Pact,' or the 1991 'Social pact for Progress'), the PSOE govern-
ment was unable to secure support from the unions. This had much to do with the experi-
ence of the 1980s when unions saw the employment potential of their wage restraint un-
dermined by tight monetary polices, and with the breakdown of the relationship between 
the PSOE and the UGT brought up by the hegemonic position of the party vis-á-vis the 
union and the uneven institutional links between both organizations (see Royo 1998 and 
Royo 2000). Given the costs that concertation had for the unions in the early 1980s, how 
can we explain unions' role in a return to national social bargaining in both Spain and 
Portugal?  
This development derives from the combination of two factors. First, the weak-
ening of trade union organizations at the firm level evidenced by the relative decline in 
union density, and the incapacity of trade unions to mobilize workers in a response to    24
manpower policies to liberalize the labor market. In other words, with their support for 
these macro-economic agreements labor sought to mitigate the decline in its bargaining 
power at the workplace level. Second, the emergence of new institutions to promote tri-
partite social bargaining in both countries (the Spanish CES, and the Portuguese CPCS) 
which resulted in the institutionalization of the political struggle among the governments, 
employers, and trade unions, and it has contributed to a transformation in the pattern of 
industrial relations. In the next sections I will argue the choices made by the social actors 
were less conditioned by pre-existing institutions. On the contrary, in Spain and Portugal 
the changing balance of power affected the predisposition of the social actors to pursue 
their strategies through a new set of institutions. At the same time, I will show how new 
emerging constraints and incentives to change largely determined their interaction and 
strategies. 
 
a.  The Weakening of Trade Union Organizations 
In Portugal, and Spain the weakening of trade union organizations at the workplace 
was evidenced by the relative decline in union density, and by their incapacity to mobi-
lize workers in a response to manpower policies to liberalize the labor market. The 
changing balance of power affected the predisposition of the unions to pursue their 
strategies through a new set of institutions. In both countries, the labor movement failed 
to translate its unity into effective power as manifested in their incapacity to resist legal 
reform initiatives aimed at liberalizing the labor markets in both countries (in Portugal 
the 1989 Pacote Laboral, and in Spain the 1994 Reforma Laboral). With their support for 
tripartite concertation agreements labor in both countries sought to mitigate this decline. 
The proportion of union members in the labor force in both Spain and Portugal has 
declined sharply over the past two decades. In Portugal union membership (as a percent-
age of wage and salary earners) has declined 44.2% between 1985 and 1995 and stands at 
25.6%. Trade union density in Spain is even lower at 18.6% after a sharp decline 
throughout the 1980s (ILO, World Employment Report 1996-1997, Geneva: ILO, 1997). 
Indeed, a detailed analysis of this trend, reinforces the thesis of this paper that trade 
unions' weaknesses forced them to seek support from new constituencies returning to na-
tional social bargaining.     25
First, the unions' interest in returning to national social bargaining was motivated by 
the realization that their strategies were eroding both their influence in the policy-making 
process and support from their constituencies. Indeed, trade unions in Spain and Portugal 
are still identified with the core permanent workforce (i.e. only 18% of the CC.OO. mem-
bers are temporary workers at a time when 34% of Spanish workers were temporary, see 
Jordana 1996, 21-220). This development has been further hastened by the spectacular 
growth of temporary employment which has led to the dualization of the labor force, ac-
centuating the labor market segmentation between insiders (workers on permanent con-
tracts with more stable, secure, and long-term prospects) and outsiders (workers on tem-
porary contracts in a more precarious situation) within firms. This has provided a buffer 
that insulates permanent workers from layoffs, leading them to bargain for higher wages.  
This dualization of the labor force was particularly worrisome for unions because it 
constrained their bargaining strength, and deprived them of members. For instance, the 
level of temporary work among new workers in Spain rose from 61% in 1987 to 81.5% in 
1990 (see Bentolila, Segura and Toharia 1991, 237-238; and Richards and Polavieja 
1997, 13-23). In Portugal the proportion of temporary workers is significantly lower and 
has moved between 10% and 13% during the 1990s (Bover, García Perea and Portugal, 
1997, 16-17). This development had clear effects on workers' involvement with the 
unions,10 and has led to the profound segmentation of workers.  
Increasing segmentation was compounded with industrial restructuring (and the eco-
nomic crisis of 1992-93) forcing the closure of large plants and massive layoffs, thus 
leading to the shrinking of the manufacturing sector-traditionally the source of union 
strength. At the end, these developments forced unions to re-evaluate their strategies in 
order to dispel the increasing perception that they only represented and defended the in-
terests of insiders at the expense of the unemployed. In other words, with these central-
ized agreements unions sought to counter the conventional wisdom that views them as 
entrenched institutions that promote the interests of insiders, while helping to improve 
macroeconomic conditions that contribute to Spain’s and Portugal's accession and con-
tinued participation in the European Monetary Union. They took advantage of a political 
                                                 
10  Richards and Polavieja (1997, 32-39) show that labor market precariousness reduces union involvement 
because it seriously impedes collective action, and it produces sentiments and attitudes of apathy towards 
unions. They conclude that temporary workers neither identify with, nor feel represented by, the unions.    26
context that provided opportunities for political bargaining at the national level to 
achieve these goals. 
Furthermore, in Portugal and Spain management recourse to manpower policies 
based upon unstable, fixed-term contracts has not prevented the appearance of contradic-
tory tendencies in the labor market. While average real wages grew moderately (see 
Tables 2 and 3), a tight labor market in some areas of rapid employment growth (particu-
larly in the case of services, banking, and insurance) led to increasing bargaining power 
in favor of certain workers who have been willing to negotiate away from the collective 
bargaining process (Stoleroff 1992, 138; Barreto and Naumann 1998, 416-418). At the 
same time, it was also very significant that the sectors that came to take much of the lead 
in wage setting in both countries were the ones over which the national unions had lower 
levels of control in which the level of unionization was only half that in industry (Pérez 
1998, 18; Barreto and Naumann 1998, 418-419), reflecting the small size of most firms. 
These developments increased unions' pressures to seek a new articulation of collective 
bargaining that would allow them to retake the initiative in the wage setting process and 
mitigate the decline in their bargaining power at the workplace level. 
The strategic shift in favor of national social bargaining by the unions was also moti-
vated by the labor movement's failure to translate its unity into effective power as mani-
fested in their incapacity to resist legal reform initiatives aimed at liberalizing the labor 
markets in both countries. In Portugal the introduction by the government of the new 
Pacote Laboral to reform the labor market in November of 1987 led the unions to organ-
ize a campaign against the proposal and to link income policy concessions to labor law 
concessions. The main thrust of the proposed reform was to ease the legal rules on tem-
porary work (a process that has started in 1976), and to broaden the criteria of fair 
dismissals to include workers' inability to adapt to changes in the nature of the job and 
'loss of confidence.' Unions vehemently opposed the reform and intensified industrial 
conflict to challenge the government. This conflict was viewed by unions, employers, and 
the government, as a "tour de force" to define the new pattern of industrial relations in 
Portugal and led to a decisive showdown: the general strike of March 28, 1988. The 
strike failed to force the government's hand and confirmed the incapacity of labor to 
mobilize workers in a collective response to manpower policies.    27
The failure to prevent the approval of the Pacote Laboral, coupled with the accel-
eration of the privatization process, the partial loosening of job security during Cavaco 
Silva's second government, and the revision of the Constitution (resulting in the modifi-
cation of the most progressive articles), showed that Portuguese labor was not able to 
translate its unity into effective power. On the contrary, these reforms were accomplished 
within a corporatist structure that contributed to prevent a political crisis, or a crisis of le-
gitimation. The defeat of labor during the struggle over law reform reduced 'the scope of 
objectives that labor can realistically establish for itself within Portuguese industrial re-
lations and politics' (Stoleroff 1992, 137). In other words, labor emerged weakened for 
the struggle and this institutional recess facilitated the consolidation of tripartite concerta-
tion. At the end, labor support for these macro-agreements mitigated the decline in its 
bargaining power at the workplace level. 
In Spain following the unraveling of social concertation in 1987 (see Royo 1998 
and Royo 2000) unions found themselves in a weak position, with very low membership 
concentrated in declining industries, dependant on state funding, and with low contrac-
tual powers. Unions' difficulties were further aggravated by the alarming use of tempo-
rary contracts, which threatened their organizational future. With the organization (and 
the massive success) of the 1988 general strike, the main two confederations (UGT and 
CC.OO.) solidified a new strategy based on three pillars: Unity of action, the abandon-
ment of social concertation, and the appeal to new constituencies to broaden their bases 
of support. The success of the strike allowed unions temporarily to regain a role in the 
political arena, which helped them to steam their organizational decline (unions' member-
ship grew to about 15% in 1994). As in Portugal, however, Spanish unions were unable 
to reverse the government's manpower policy initiatives.  
The struggle between unions and the government centered on the ways to achieve 
the Maastricth criteria for EMU membership. The socialists' convergence plan led to two 
more general strikes. The first one in May 1992, took place over the so-called 'decretazo' 
-i.e a government decree establishing cuts in unemployment coverage by reducing the 
amount and length of benefits, tightening eligibility conditions, and increasing the re-
quired period of work to collect benefits from six months to one year. The second one 
took place in January 1994 over a government proposal to reform labor laws that sought 
to flexibilize work conditions and increase the scope of collective bargaining.     28
As in Portugal, increasing mobilization and union unity did not lead to labor vic-
tories. The failure of the unions to stop labor law reform and force a political crisis 
through continued social mobilization forced them to re-evaluate their strategies and 
adopt a more conciliatory stance that included resuming partial tripartite agreements with 
the government and the employers. This strategic shift was further hastened in Spain by 
the internal problems experienced by the two main confederations, with the UGT at-
tempting to turn the page on the collapse of its housing initiative, and the CC.OO. to put 
aside internal ideological differences. These problems led to the emergence of new 
leadership in both unions that sought to strengthen the unity of action strategy while 
resuming partial agreements with the government and the employers' association.  
The change of strategy was hastened by the impact of the economic crisis of the 
early 1990s, labor rigidities, and the opening of the Spanish and Portuguese economies to 
external competition. These factors forced Portuguese and Spanish firms to develop new 
competitive strategies, seeking greater flexibility, internal mobility, and the externaliza-
tion of production to small nonunionized firms. Product decentralization is reflected in 
the growth in the number of small firms (under 50 workers)-which increased in Spain 
from 95.1% of firms in 1978 to 98.1% in 1989, and in Portugal from 95.4% in 1989 to 
96.7%, and their share of employment which grew from 38.4% to 52.2% in Spain and 
from 42.3% to 50.3% in Portugal during the same periods (Fraile 1999, 280; Richards 
and Polavieja 1997, 31; Barreto and Neumann, 1998, 400). In Portugal there is a higher 
proportion of small firms than anywhere else in the EU, with 79.4% of firms employing 
fewer than 10 workers in 1994. The combination of all these factors has led to the in-
creasing individualization of labor relations, has contributed to lower labor costs, and has 
given firms more flexibility in the work organization and in the deployment of labor 
through mobility, overtime, part-time work, and rotation. These developments had worri-
some consequences for unions and forced them to revalue their strategies. 
In summary, in Spain and Portugal, the combination of high unemployment and 
high temporary works, coupled with changes in the occupational structure and the 
individualization of employment relations forced unions to reassess their approaches.11 
                                                 
11 In Portugal, partly due to political reasons and its links with the PCP, the CGTP has been more reluctant 
to embrace this new approach and has refused to sign centralized agreements. They have continued with a 
strategy of "conflictive engagement."    29
The unions eventually realized that these developments threatened their survival and 
decided that they had to counter them. Given the emerging distance between the trade 
unions and a growing section of the workers, they felt that they had to narrow that gap. In 
this context they decided to develop a new strategic design committed to the expansion of 
their support base. This led them to develop a broader strategy with which to tackle 
unemployment and promote job stability through national social bargaining with the 
government and/or employers. In order to achieve these objectives unions refocused their 
attention on the firm to increase membership and regain control over the work councils 
and the contractual process vis-à-vis employers. They also developed unitary bargaining 
platforms that focused on certain strategic areas: temporary contracts, unemployment, 
work organization, training, information rights, and health and safety (Fraile 1999, 297) 
aimed at bridging the divide between insiders and outsiders. These platforms would be 
the objective of national bargaining with employers and/or the government and would led 
to the re-emergence of national social bargaining. This new approach signaled a strategic 
shift on the part of the unions, which were now willing to accept more internal flexibility 
in the organization and deployment of labor within the workplace, in exchange for 
greater employment stability. By promoting centralized bargaining and a new articulation 
of the collective bargaining system, they were making sure that peak confederations will 
remain significant players. 
The strategic turn in favor of social bargaining was accelerated as a result of the 
combined processes of economic liberalization, privatization, and European integration 
(see Stoleroff 1992; Barreto and Neumman 1998). These developments had a significant 
impact in the industrial relations setting in both countries. At the macroeconomic level, 
the drive to prepare Spain and Portugal for full integration within EMU influenced their 
governments' anti-inflationary stance. In this regard, centralized bargaining has been an 
adequate instrument for the application of the governments' policies (particularly in the 
case of Portugal in which the government participated in the wage negotiations through 
the CPCS). Since wages are such an important component of unit costs, wage bargaining 
became a cornerstone of these governments' anti-inflation policy (and the prospect to 
meet the EMU criteria), therefore, enhancing the political function of the unions and the 
concertation process.     30
At the micro level these processes have intensified competitive pressures and con-
tributed to a shift in the balance of forces away from labor. Firms in both countries have 
been forced to design new strategies to confront new competitive challenges and have 
had to develop restructuring schemes, that in many cases have led to the emergence of 
tripartite negotiations (i.e the textile industry in Portugal). At the same time, unions have 
been forced to accept new pressures to adjust working conditions and wages to the level 
of more advanced countries in order to increase competitiveness and create new jobs. 
Finally, European integration has forced the social actors to address the discrepancies 
between Spanish and Portuguese provisions regulation labor markets and collective 
bargaining and those prevailing in other EU countries. In this context, unions in both 
countries have taken advantage of a political context that provided opportunities for 
political exchange at the national level. This process was facilitated by the emergence of 
new institutions that fostered consensus among the social actors. 
 
b. The Emergence of the CES and the CPCS 
The Spanish and Portuguese experience with social bargain suggest that one of 
the key difficulties in building coordinating capacity among the social actors is the need 
to build up common procedures based upon precedents, decision rules, and shared bodies 
concerning information transfers. In this regard, the creation of formal institutions that 
foster consensus and understanding among the social actors may be able to contribute to 
the development and consolidation of the social bargaining processes. Indeed, the Com-
misão Permanente de Concertação Social in Portugal (CPCS or Standing Committee for 
Social Concertation) and the Consejo Económico y Social in Spain (CES, or Economic 
and Social Council) have played a critical role in promoting tripartite social bargaining in 
both countries, by bringing business, the government, and unions together, and fostering 
the informal institutional mechanisms that facilitate social bargaining. This development 
has resulted in the institutionalization of the political struggle between the government, 
employers, and trade unions, and it has contributed to a transformation in the pattern of 
industrial relations. 
The Portuguese CPCS was created in 1984 by the 'Center Block' (PS-PSD) gov-
ernment. As a consequence of the Constitutional reform of 1989 (see Manuel 1996, 64), 
the CPCS was 'replaced' in 1991 by the Conselho Economico e Social (CES) and was    31
transformed into a commission within the CES. The new institution inherited the func-
tions of the CPCS and acquired new consultative responsibilities. So far the new CPCS 
has participated in three agreements for the years 1992, 1996, and 1997-1999. 
In Spain the Economic and Social Council (CES) was created in 1991. It was es-
tablished as an independent and consultative institution that guarantees the participation 
of the economic and social actors in the economic and social legislative and policy-
making processes. The CES has no formal responsibilities involving social concertation. 
However, it has worked as a forum of discussion and debate about socio-economic issues 
that has helped to bring together the social actors.  
The CPCS and the CES have been key players. They have contributed to a shift in 
the context of the class struggle and have become critical instruments in the consolidation 
of national social bargaining in both countries. This is so because their reports about soci-
economic legislative proposals promote the development of consensual positions (i.e. a 
'common position' is more likely to influence the parliamentary debate and to affect the 
final legislation). Therefore, this process offers incentives for the reconciliation of dis-
puting positions and has facilitated the rapprochement of the social actors. Furthermore, 
the bargaining dynamic generated through this process has helped to overcome tradi-
tional antagonisms and has fostered the search for joint positions among the social actors. 
At the end, the permanent bargaining that takes places in the CES and the CPCS has 
resulted in an improved climate among the labor market actors and in the relationship 
between the social actors and the government.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The resurgence of national level bargaining on incomes policy and other eco-
nomic issues in Portugal and Spain derives from the combination of the weakening of 
trade union organizations at the branch and firm level and the failure of these govern-
ments to achieve macroeconomic policy objectives. I have argued that new emerging 
constraints and incentives to change largely determined their interaction and strategies. 
Moreover, the choices made by the social actors were less conditioned by pre-existing 
institutions. The changing balance of power affected the predisposition of the social 
actors to pursue their strategies through a new set of institutions. In this regard, the 
emergence of new institutions to promote tripartite social bargaining in both countries    32
(the Spanish CES and the Portuguese CPCS) has contributed to a transformation in the 
pattern of industrial relations in both countries. 
What are the prospects for national social bargaining in both countries? It is still 
not clear whether current trends will persist in the future, whether they will consolidate 
the traditional dominant role of the state in industrial relations, or permit the social actors 
to take the initiative and assert their autonomy. Wage moderation, however, is key to 
closing the gap with the EU's richer countries (GDP per head in Spain is only 79% of the 
EU average while Portugal's is 74%), exploiting Europe-wide specialization, and attract-
ing investment from its European partners (average hourly compensation in manufactur-
ing is still less than half the German level).  
The success (or failure) of these initiatives will determine the consolidation of this 
approach. At the same time, the preceding discussion suggests that the motivations that 
led the social actors to return to national social bargaining, are more structural than the 
goal of participation in EMU and are likely to persist after the onset of EMU. The social 
actors should have powerful incentives to continue this approach given the difficulties 
that the government and employers had in the past controlling overall wage growth with-
out the support from unions, coupled with the erosion that further fragmentation would 
have on the position of the main confederations. Furthermore, the examination of the role 
played by the CES and the CPCS suggest that a cooperative strategy based on social bar-
gaining will last longer the more the social actors have been able to develop a capacity 
for strategic learning. 
The Portuguese and Spanish experiences have implications for the broader debate 
on European Monetary Union. This discussion is also relevant to existing explanations of 
European monetary integration.12 Now that the Euro unites the area's 11 national econo-
mies wage settlements matter more than ever. Excessive wage increases in one country 
will mean a loss of competitiveness vis-a-vis its neighbors and could test a country's 
                                                 
12 For an analysis of the reasons that have compelled European countries to move towards monetary 
integration see: Moravcsik 1998; Cameron 1998; Dyson and Featherstone 1999; Henning 1998. These 
authors explore the process of European monetary integration. They seek to shed further light on why the 
member states of the EC sought to extend supranational authority in the domain of monetary policy. These 
authors emphasize the role of economic interdependence, issue linkage, institutions, domestic politics, 
systemic influences, and the need to address and resolve tensions and conflicts over monetary and ex-
change-rate policy.  These arguments are relevant to the discussion about social concertation because they 
raise issues that are directly related to the decisions by the social actors in Portugal and Spain to experi-
ment with social bargaining. I will explore these issues extensively in a forthcoming book.    33
ability to stay in EMU. Therefore, the main challenge for EMU countries will be to craft 
wage agreements that do not undermine competitiveness by raising unit labor costs above 
those of its Euro-zone neighbors. A real risk facing the European Central Bank (ECB) is 
that the four Euro-zone countries with highest inflation rates-that is, Spain, Portugal, 
Italy, and Ireland- will experience consistently higher inflation than their fellow Euro-
zone members over the coming years testing the ability of the single currency to hold 
together.13 
It is important to emphasize that the participation of these countries in the EMU 
project will not necessarily help their governments and employers to control wages. On 
the contrary, the ability of the Spanish and Portuguese governments to overcome this 
challenge is limited by the ECB's power to set interest rates for the Euro-zone as a whole. 
Therefore, Portugal and Spain will continue facing the problem of controlling wages in a 
relatively fragmented and decentralized bargaining structure.14 EMU may easy tensions 
in wage bargaining by breaking down market barriers that have protected sheltered 
sectors, thus exposing them to greater competition and not permitting them to externalize 
some of the costs of militancy through markup pricing. At the same time, however, since 
devaluations are ruled out within EMU, the need to control wages to maintain external 
competitiveness should encourage the social actors to reinforce the institutional mecha-
                                                 
13 According to the Financial Times' "Mediterranean trio seen as threat to euro-zone inflation hopes." 
(January 19
th, 2000, p. 3) in 1999 France recorded its lowest inflation since 1954 at 0.5% (this year is 
expected to have an average rate of 1.1%); Germany averaged 0.7% (1.4% is expected this year). In Italy, 
Spain ad Portugal, however, the expectation is that average inflation in the year 2000 will be 1.9%, 2.5%, 
and 2.3% respectively (compared with 1.7%, 2.3% and 2.2% in 1999). This inflation differential points to a 
productivity gap between these countries and the Franco-German core (productivity in 1999 was 25% 
lower in Italy, 35% lower in Spain, and 76% lower in Portugal than in Germany, while all the other euro-
zone countries have brought their productivity within 10.5% or less of the German level). If this differen-
tial is sustained over a long period of time it may test the trios ability to compete in the euro-zone with their 
neighbors. According to this article, if the Mediterranean countries maintain the same levels of productivity 
growth of the 1990s it will take Italy 18 years, Spain 34 years, and Portugal 74 years to come to within 10 
points of Germany. Since different productivity rates in a monetary union are expressed through different 
inflation rates these 3 countries are expected to endure higher inflation for years to come.  
14 This problem is particularly acute in Spain where public sector wage settlements tend to set the national 
benchmark, and where some wage contracts contain clauses not only for productivity-related rises but for 
post-dated compensation for the difference between expected and annual inflation. For instance, these 
clauses came into effect last year when the government had to increase the inflation forecast. The conse-
quence was that overall unit labor costs rose by 1.3% in 1999. For the year 200 wages are expected to 
increase between 2.75% and 3%. The government inflation target is 2%, but inflation is likely to increase 
between 2.3and 2.8%. See Financial Times, "Euro-zone pressures likely to squeeze out big wage in-
creases" December 24
th, 1999, p.2.    34
nisms that have resulted in wage moderation--i.e. a centralized framework bargaining 
(see Pérez 1998, 21-23).  
Recent studies (Iversen 1999, Hall and Franzese 1998) have emphasized the supe-
rior economic performance of certain combinations of bargaining arrangements. Iversen 
highlights the benefits of an industry-or sector-based bargaining system combined with a 
non-accommodating macroeconomic regime. According to this analysis, the "collective-
action problem facing unions in intermediate centralized systems, which can lead to ex-
cessive wage demands and unemployment, is 'solved' (or at least dissipated) by an agent 
(i.e. an autonomous central bank) that is deliberately nonaccomodating to union objec-
tives" (Iversen 1999, 34). The Portuguese and Spanish experiences, however, reflect the 
limits of monetary policy when the bargaining parties lack a sufficient, autonomous co-
ordinating capacity in a relative fragmented and decentralized bargaining context (Pérez 
1998, 22). As other authors have pointed out (Hall and Franzese 1998), a positive out-
come is strongly dependent on the organizational coordination capacity of unions and 
employers which will make them responsive to threats from the monetary and fiscal 
authorities. The social actors in Spain and Portugal, however, lack the organizational 
features that have facilitated the coordination of wage bargaining at different levels in 
other countries (i.e the leadership role played by IGMetall in Germany). As we have 
seen, in Spain and Portugal attempts on the part of the governments to impose wage 
discipline through very tight monetary policies backfired in a fragmented and relatively 
decentralized bargaining context. National social bargaining has proven to be the most 
effective way through which employers, governments, and unions were able to moderate 
wage growth and maintain the international competitive position of their firms (Pérez 
1998, 22). 
Finally, European Monetary Union will mean further restrictions on domestic 
economic policies because monetary union subjects macroeconomic policy in the EMU 
area to a single monetary authority, the independent European Central Bank. Although 
some scholars have already predicted the dismissal of centralized concertation schemes, 
new analyses are proving the importance that incomes policy will have in the context of 
the monetary union (Iversen 1999, Royo 2000). Incomes policy, with its influence on 
labor relations and labor costs, seems to continue to be an adequate instrument to en-
hance competitiveness and contribute to the convergence objective pursued by the    35
European economies. The benefits of centralized wage bargaining, however, hinge 
largely on the ability of union leaders to control overall wage growth in order to avoid 
monetary policy measures that will result in higher unemployment (Pérez 1998, 22). The 
EMU will result in the decentralization of the level of wage bargaining across the EU 
because overall, the most encompassing union organizations will be less inclusive, and, 
therefore, they may have less incentives to internalize the inflationary pressures of wage 
increases. The risk will be that in the new EMU context, in which wage bargaining is 
relatively fragmented but there is s single monetary authority for the area, wage bargain-
ers will be less responsive to threats from the ECB. Nevertheless, since unit labor costs 
will still remain a critical factor in improving competitiveness, there will be strong 
pressures on governments, employers, and unions to pursue national social bargaining. 
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